INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the market for syndicated loans 1 reached 2.8 trillion USD (Thomson Financial, 2006) and represented more than one third of the funds raised on the worldwide financial markets (Altunbas, Gadanecz and Kara, 2006) . This tremendous growth can be attributed to the advantages inherent in syndicated lending for borrowers and lenders. Lenders can diversify loan portfolios and sources of income. Furthermore, lenders can exploit comparative advantages of syndicate members through financing and information sharing. Syndication leads to more competitive pricing and more flexible funding structure, which benefit borrowers. In addition, the borrower is restricted to negotiation with one bank and he can benefit from potential bilateral relationships with other syndicate members.
Informational frictions between the members of the syndicate can lead to agency problems. Therefore, the numerous advantages come at a cost. In a syndicated loan setting, the participants delegate monitoring to an arranger whose efforts are unobservable, which may generate moral hazard problems. Additionally, if the private information collected by the arranger through due diligence or through previous lending relationships cannot be credibly communicated to the participants, an adverse selection problem arises. Furthermore, the syndicate is also exposed to the influence of the banking environment. The latter influences corporate ownership, financing policies, capital allocation and the terms of bank loan contracts.
The structure of a syndicate can be considered as an organizational response to agency costs (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001 ). The arranger's role is to monitor the efforts of participants and he or she can consequently adapt the size and the composition of the syndicate, which involves explicit and implicit costs and revenue tradeoffs. For instance, the arranger decides on the institutions to invite, chooses the initial menu of designated amounts for participation, and the dollar size and associated fees for each bracket.
Furthermore, the arranger can adjust his or her portion of the loan to align with monitoring incentives, establish a signal of borrower's quality, and form a smaller syndicate to fund opaque and risky borrowers. Finally, the presence of multiple coarrangers can mitigate adverse selection problems by over-seeing a lead arranger.
In this article, we empirically investigate how the banking environment influences the structure of syndicates, which is designed to be adapted to agency problems stemming from the syndication process. After controlling for various loan agreement terms and borrower's financial characteristics, we focus on several characteristics of this environment, including banking sector structure, financial development, bank prudential regulation, and legal risk. Using the power of cross-country analysis, we perform our study on a sample of more than 15,000 syndicated loan facilities covering 24 markets over a period of 15 years.
This article completes and further develops existing empirical research on syndicate structure by Lee and Mullineaux (2004) , Jones, Lang and Nigro (2005) , Bosch and Steffen Sufi (2007) . The above authors demonstrate that syndicates on the US and the UK markets are structured to enhance monitoring efforts and to facilitate renegotiation. These studies focus solely on single markets and do not account for the influence of the banking environment on syndicate structure. However, following a large body of research on law and finance pioneered by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer 4 and Vishny (1997) and recently by Qian and Strahan (2007) , the banking environment has a significant impact on the design of loan contracts, banking performance and economic and financial development. In regards to syndicated lending, Esty and Megginson (2003) found that syndicates funding project finance are larger and more diffuse in countries with poorly defined creditor rights and weak banking legal systems.
However, Esty and Megginson's (2003) results addressed a specific loan purpose and did not provide in depth insights into the influence of other components of the banking environment on syndicate structure.
In the remaining sections of this article, we discuss the theoretical and empirical background of syndication in section 2 and we present the empirical design of our work and discuss our results in section 3. Finally we provide an overview of our conclusions in section 4.
LOAN SYNDICATION AND SYNDICATE STRUCTURE (i) Loan syndication and agency problems
The members of a syndicate can be divided into two groups. The senior banks bearing mandated arrangers, arrangers, or agents titles, are typically appointed by the borrower to bring together the bank syndicate. These lenders are often the borrower's relationship banks and form the "core" of the syndicate -the arrangers -who retain a portion of the loan and look for junior members -the participants. The latter, typically bearing manager or participant titles, earn a spread for funding a portion of the loan.
The process of bank loan syndication can be separated into three main stages.
During the pre-mandated phase, the borrower solicits competitive offers to arrange and manage the syndication with one or more banks. The borrower chooses one or more arrangers that are mandated to form a syndicate, and consequently negotiates a preliminary loan agreement. The arranger acts as the syndicate's agent, which involves such tasks as funds administration, interest calculation, and covenants enforcement.
During the post-mandated phase, the arranger begins the syndication process. This involves drafting a preliminary loan contract and preparing a documentation package for the potential syndicate members, called an information memorandum. The memorandum contains information about a borrower's creditworthiness and the loan terms. A roadshow is then organized to present and discuss the content of the memorandum, to present fees, establish a timetable for commitments and closing, formally invite potential participants and determine allocations. The third and last phase takes place after completion, when the loan becomes operational, binding the borrower and the syndicate members to the debt contract.
Loan syndication results in several agency problems. First, private information about the borrower can create adverse selection issues, as the arranger may be inclined to syndicate loans from unreliable borrowers. However, such opportunistic behavior generates a reputation risk for the arranger and negatively affects the success of future syndications (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001) . Second, the participating banks delegate monitoring tasks to the arranger. However, participant banks are not privy to the efforts of the arranger, leading to moral hazard problems. Nonetheless, the arranger has less incentive to monitor the borrower than if it were to lend the full amount of the loan (Pennacchi, 1988) . Third, an important issue in syndication is related to borrower's financial distress. Funding is more complicated in such settings because lenders must reach a collective decision (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996) .
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The structure of the syndicate should be equipped to tackle such agency problems.
For instance, to provide credible signal regarding the quality of the borrower and to align monitoring incentives, the arranger adjusts its own loan portion (Jones, Lang and Nigro, 2005; Sufi, 2007 Banking structure is a two variable proxy. Overheads, defined as the ratio of banking overhead costs to total assets, measures cost inefficiency in a banking industry.
Cost efficient banks should be more effective in risk management, screening and monitoring and consequently less exposed to hidden information problems within the syndicate. Also, since syndicated loans imply the sharing of administration and origination costs, cost inefficiency is expected to encourage the formation of larger syndicates. Consequently, we can expect a positive coefficient for this variable.
Concentration, defined as the assets of the three largest banks as a share of all bank assets, proxies market structure in the industry. Several arguments suggest this variable should have a negative influence on syndicate size. First, a greater concentration means a lower number of potential participants to join a syndicate. Second, banks with greater market shares in a banking industry already benefit from diversified loan portfolios and have little incentive to diversify further. Finally, the motivation provided by increased revenue from syndicated loans should exert a lower effect for banks with greater profitability, generally due to stronger market power.
We also include two variables that consider the development of financial markets.
Stock Markets is defined as the value of listed shares to GDP and measures the development of stock markets. Allen and Gottesman (2006) have shown that stock markets and syndicated loan markets are highly integrated, facilitating information flow among markets. The development of stock markets contributes to information disclosure.
The availability of information mitigates the adverse selection problems resulting from the private information owned by the lead bank on the borrower. Consequently, we should observe a positive coefficient for this variable. However, one may also consider that for some companies, stock markets are an alternative source of financing for large loans. Therefore, the more developed the stock market the greater potential for a reduction in the syndicated loan potential. Subsequently, an increase in the share of non syndicated bank loans is observed. Such influences should be even more prominent for the development of bond markets, measured by the sum of private and public domestic debt securities to GDP. In regards to large financing needs of companies, bonds directly compete for syndicated loans. However, this negative influence may also be offset by the positive effect of the existence of bond markets, which contribute to increased information for participant banks in loan syndicates and therefore limits the adverse selection problems.
Banking regulation is our third category of banking environment variables. We 
EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND RESULTS

(i) Data and methodology
Syndicated loans sample is obtained from the Dealscan database, provided by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters). Financial structure and regulatory and supervisory characteristics data are gathered from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) and Barth, Caprio and Levine (2005 Table 1, while Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables. The definitions of variables are provided in Table A .1 in the appendix.
-Insert Table 1 about hereJapan appears as the largest syndicated loan market with more than 4,000 loan facilities operating over the period under investigation, followed by Australia, Germany, Spain, South Korea and Taiwan, each with more than 1,000 facilities. On average, the number of lenders ranges between five and 14 and two and seven arrangers. Finally, the average loan size is between 100 and 1,000 million USD, with the largest average deals approved in Germany.
-Insert Table 2 
Number of Arrangers = g(Banking Environment, Loan Characteristics, Borrower Characteristics)
(ii) Results and discussion
We perform three series of regressions for equations (1) and (2) with different sets of explanatory variables. Results are provided in Table 3 . The first set of regressions (1.1 and 1.2) is a benchmark displaying only loan agreement and borrower characteristics. We drop loan characteristics in the second set (2.1 and 2.2) and we instead include banking environment characteristics. Finally, the third set (3.1 and 3.2) includes all characteristics and also serves to evaluate the robustness of our results.
-Insert Table 3 about here -
We first observe that all regression analyses have satisfactory explanatory power with R² equal to at least 30%. We also remark that most of the loan agreement characteristics are significant and robust across regression analyses. Loan Size reveals a 7 The most represented industry sectors are Financial Services, General Manufacturing, Utilities, Transportation and Construction. 8 As a robustness check, we also perform Poisson and Tobit regressions and obtain virtually similar results.
14 positive coefficient and is significant over all regressions, suggesting that larger syndicates form around larger loans in accordance with diversifying loan portfolios and regulatory-driven issues (as in Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Sufi, 2007 Variables assessing lender's protection mechanisms reveale that Senior Debt always result in a negative coefficient and is significant in equation (2) and positive in equation (1), while the presence of financial covenants positively affects both the number of lenders and of arrangers, the latter also being influenced by the presence of guarantors.
Hence, debt seniority works as an effective protection device for all lenders, reducing agency problems within the syndicate and allowing for larger syndicates with fewer arrangers. The presence of a guarantor suggests an increased loan risk (Berger and Udell, 1990; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004) and, consequently, a loan plagued by greater agency problems, for which a larger syndicate "core" composed of numerous arrangers promotes more effective monitoring. Finally, the restriction of discretionary power of the borrower through the presence of covenants effectively reduces the risk of loan default (Rajan and Winton, 1995) , and enhances the ability to monitor the borrower, thereby reducing the monitoring costs and leading to larger syndicates 9 . In regards to borrower characteristics, larger firms are associated with larger syndicates, in a similar manner as loan size. Also, more profitable borrowers reveal smaller syndicate structures, while leverage has no statistically significant effect on syndicate size 10 .
In the analysis of banking environment variables in specifications (1.2) and (2.2), the results show significance among most variables. Our results demonstrate that all forms of banking environment characteristics are important for the syndicate structure in the sense that we observe significant coefficients for legal environment, financial development, and banking structure and regulation. Finally, we observed that enhanced creditor rights protection has a negative and significant influence on the number of lenders but no effect on the number of arrangers.
A better protection of creditors might reduce lenders' incentives to monitor borrowers. Our last set of regressions (1.3 and 2.3) control for all individual characteristics (both loan agreement and borrower) and the banking environment, and serves as a robustness check. We note that most of the borrower risk proxies are significant and the more risky firms are associated with smaller syndicates, which serve to mitigate agency problems. Furthermore, we also observe that when we control for borrower risk, several banking environment characteristics influence both lenders and arrangers, in areas such 12 The components are: Secured Creditor Paid First, Restriction on Reorganization, or Management Stays. These dummies equal to one if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of proceeds that result from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm, if the reorganization procedure imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent, to file for reorganization, or if the debtor keeps the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization process respectively. 13 These variables are defined as indexes, scaled from 0 to 10 with lower scores for higher risks, corruption or inefficiency, assessing the risk of "outright confiscation" or "forced nationalization" and of the ''risk of a modification in a contract", the level of corruption in government or assessing the "efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business" respectively. Our results are congruent with previous research, which shows that syndicate structure is adapted to the specific agency problems related to syndication and re-contracting issues (Esty and Megginson, 2003; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Jones, Lang and Nigro, 2005; Sufi, 2007 (General Corporate, Debt Repayment, Working Capital, Project Finance) , benchmark rate (Libor, Euribor), year, region, industry sector, and Syndicated Loans and French Law variables are included in the regressions but are not reported. ***, **, and * indicate coefficients statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level respectively. 
